FISCAL POLICY, INCOME REDISTRIBUTION, AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES

Nora Lustig

Working Paper 54
January 2017
(Revised May 2018)
The CEQ Working Paper Series

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FISCAL POLICY, INCOME REDISTRIBUTION, AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES*

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ABSTRACT

Using comparative fiscal incidence analysis, this paper examines the impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty in twenty-nine low-and middle-income countries for circa the year 2010. Success in fiscal redistribution is driven primarily by redistributive efforts (share of social spending to GDP in each country) and the extent to which transfers are targeted to the poor and direct taxes are targeted to the rich. While fiscal policy always reduces inequality, this is not the case with poverty. While spending on preschool and primary school is pro-poor (the per capita transfer declines with income) in almost all countries, pro-poor secondary school spending is less prevalent, and tertiary education spending tends to be progressive only in relative terms (equalizing, but not pro-poor). Health spending is always equalizing except for in Jordan.

JEL Codes: H22, H5, D31, I3

Keywords: Fiscal incidence, social spending, inequality, poverty, developing countries

* Chapter 10 in Lustig, Nora (editor). 2018. Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty (Brookings Institution Press and CEQ Institute, Tulane University). [The online version of the Handbook is available here: http://www.commitmenttoequity.org/publications-ceq-handbook/]. Launched in 2008, the CEQ project is an initiative of the Center for Inter-American Policy and Research (CIPR) and the department of Economics, Tulane University, the Center for Global Development and the Inter-American Dialogue. The CEQ project is housed in the Commitment to Equity Institute at Tulane. For more details visit www.commitmenttoequity.org. I am very grateful to Israel Martinez and Cristina Carrera for their valuable research assistance. All errors and omissions remain my sole responsibility.

† Nora Lustig is Samuel Z. Stone Professor of Latin American Economics and Director of the Commitment to Equity Institute (CEQ), Tulane University and nonresident senior fellow of the Center for Global Development and the Inter-American Dialogue, and non-resident senior research fellow at UNU-WIDER.
1. Introduction

Two key indicators of a government’s (or society’s) commitment to equalizing opportunities and reducing poverty and social exclusion are the share of total income devoted to social spending and how equalizing and pro-poor this spending is. Typically, redistributive social spending includes cash benefits and benefits in kind such as spending on education and health. As shown in Enami, Lustig, and Aranda (2018) and Enami (2018), the redistributive potential of a country does indeed depend on the size and composition of government spending and how it is financed, as well as the progressivity of all the taxes and government spending combined.

Analogously, the impact of fiscal policy on poverty will depend on the size and incidence of government spending and revenues. Recall that, in theory, a fiscal system can be inequality-reducing but poverty-increasing. How so? If every individual in the system pays more in taxes than he or she receives in transfers but the proportion of net tax payments (as a share of prefiscal or Market Income) is higher for the rich than for the poor, the system would be inequality-reducing but poverty-increasing. As we shall see, this result is not uncommon in actual fiscal systems, especially when we focus on the cash portion of the fiscal systems (the analysis that does not include the impact of the monetized value of government services). Given the importance of the size and composition of government revenues and spending, we start by showing the patterns observed in the twenty-nine countries analyzed here.

The main objective here is to analyze the impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty in twenty-nine low- and middle-income countries from around 2010. The studies apply the same fiscal incidence methodology described in detail in chapters 1, 6, 7, and 8 in this Handbook. With a long tradition in applied public finance, fiscal incidence analysis is designed to respond to the question of who benefits from government transfers and who ultimately bears the burden of taxes in the economy. The fiscal

Because national and international agencies often update their data series, the information included here may be subject to change. For updates, the reader is referred to the CEQ Standard Indicators, available online in the CEQ Institute’s website, http://www.commitmenttoequity.org/datacenter.

3 Lindert (2004) and Barr (2012).

4 “Cash” benefits typically include cash transfers and near-cash transfers such as school feeding programs and free uniforms and textbooks. Depending on the analysis, cash benefits also include consumption subsidies (for example, on food) and energy consumption and housing subsidies. The studies included here include cash and near-cash transfers as well as (in most cases) consumption subsidies.

5 Social spending as a category frequently includes spending on pensions funded by contributions. Following Lindert (1994). Strictly speaking, one should include the subsidized portion of these pensions as part of redistributive social spending (for example, the portion of contributory pensions that is paid out of general revenues and not from contributions). However, estimates of these subsidies are hard to produce. As an alternative, the analysis here is presented for the two extreme scenarios: pensions as pure deferred income (also called replacement income) and pensions as pure government transfer. Noncontributory pensions (also known as social or minimum pensions) are treated as any other cash transfer.

6 At the time this paper was written, the World Bank classified countries as follows. Low-income: US$1,025 or less; lower middle-income: US$1,026-4,035; upper-middle-income: US$4,036-12,475; and, high-income: US$12,476 or more. The classification uses Gross National Income per capita calculated with the World Bank Atlas Method, June 2017 (see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups). Using the World Bank classification, the group includes three low-income countries: Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda; ten lower-middle-income countries: Armenia, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia; fourteen upper-middle-income countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Georgia, Iran, Jordan, Mexico, Peru, Russia, South Africa, and Venezuela; and two high-income countries: Chile, and Uruguay.

7 Strictly speaking, the studies reviewed here were produced using Lustig and Higgins (2013), an earlier version of the handbook which is available upon request.

8 Musgrave (1959); Pechman (1985); Martinez-Vazquez (2008).
 policy instruments included here are: personal income and payroll taxes, direct transfers, consumption taxes, consumption subsidies, and transfers in-kind in the form of education and healthcare free or subsidized services.

The data utilized here is based on the CEQ Assessments available in the Commitment to Equity Institute’s\(^9\) database on fiscal redistribution (for twenty-nine low- and middle-income countries and the United States): Argentina, Armenia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela. The CEQ Assessments for Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay are published in a Public Finance Review special issue by Lustig, Pessino, and Scott.\(^10\) The results for Ghana and Tanzania, as well as the United States, are published in other peer-reviewed journals.\(^11\) The CEQ Assessments for Armenia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Indonesia, Jordan, Russia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka appear in the World Bank volume edited by Inchauste and Lustig.\(^12\) The CEQ Assessments for Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Tunisia, and Uganda are chapters in this Handbook.\(^13\) The studies for Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, and Nicaragua are available in the CEQ Working Paper series at www.commitmentoequity.org.\(^14\) The results for Colombia and Venezuela are in the CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (same website).\(^15\) The household surveys used in the country studies include either income or consumption as the welfare indicator.\(^16\) As explained in chapter 1 in this Handbook,\(^17\) given

\(^9\) Launched first as a project in 2008, the Commitment to Equity Institute (CEQ) at Tulane University was created in 2015 with the generous support of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
\(^11\) Ghana: Younger, Osei-Assibey, and Oppong (2017); Tanzania: Younger, Myamba, and Mdadila (2016a); and, United States: Higgins and others (2016).
\(^12\) Inchauste and Lustig (2017). Armenia: Younger and Khachatryan (2017); Ethiopia: Hill and others (2017); Georgia: Cancho and Bondarenko (2017); Indonesia: Jellem, Wai-Poi, and Atkar (2017); Jordan: Alam, Inchauste, and Serajuddin (2017); Russia: Lopez-Calva and others (2017); South Africa: Inchauste and others (2017); and Sri Lanka: Arunatilake, Inchauste, and Lustig (2017).
\(^13\) Argentina: Rossignolo (2018); Chile: Martinez-Aguilar and others (2018); Dominican Republic: Aristy-Escudер and others (2018); El Salvador: Beneke de Sanfeliu, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda (2018); Tunisia: Jouini and others (2018); and, Uganda: Jellem and others (2018).
\(^14\) Costa Rica: Sauma and Trejos (2014a); Ecuador: Llerena and others (2015); Guatemala: ICEFI (2017a); Honduras: ICEFI (2017b); Iran: Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri (2017a); and, Nicaragua: ICEFI (2017c).
\(^15\) Colombia: Melendez and Martinez (2015); and, Venezuela: Molina (2016).
that contributory pensions are part deferred income and part government transfer, results were calculated under both scenarios (that is, as pure deferred income and pure government transfers).

While fiscal policy unambiguously reduces income inequality, this is not always true for poverty. In Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Guatemala the extreme poverty headcount ratio is higher after taxes and transfers than before.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, to varying degrees, in all countries a portion of the poor are net payers into the fiscal system and are thus impoverished by the fiscal system.\textsuperscript{19} While all taxes can be poverty-increasing as long as the poor and near poor have to pay taxes, consumption taxes are the main culprits of fiscally induced impoverishment. As for the impact of specific instruments on inequality, net direct taxes and spending on education and health are always equalizing, and net indirect taxes are equalizing in nineteen countries of the twenty-nine. An examination of the relationship between prefiscal inequality and social spending (as a share of GDP) and fiscal redistribution suggests that there is no evidence of a “Robin Hood paradox”; the more unequal countries tend to spend more on redistribution and show a higher redistributive effect, but the coefficient for the latter is not always significant. Preliminary results of regression-based analysis indicate that the positive association between initial inequality and the size of the redistributive effect is not robust across the board. When one controls for income per capita and leaves out the “outliers” or measures redistribution in percent change instead of Gini points, the coefficient is often not statistically significant.

Several caveats are in order. The fiscal incidence analysis used here is point-in-time and does not incorporate behavioral or general equilibrium effects. That is, no claim is made that the prefiscal equals the true counterfactual income in the absence of taxes and transfers. The analysis is a first-order approximation that measures the average incidence of fiscal interventions. However, the analysis is not a mechanically applied accounting exercise. The incidence of taxes is the economic rather than the statutory incidence. It is assumed that individual income taxes and contributions by both employees and employers, for instance, are borne by labor in the formal sector. Individuals who are not contributing to social security are assumed to pay neither direct taxes nor contributions. Consumption taxes are fully shifted forward to consumers. In the case of consumption taxes, the analyses take into account the lower incidence associated with own-consumption, rural markets, and informality.

2. Taxes and Public Spending: Levels and Composition

Figure 1 shows government revenues as a share of GDP for around 2010. The revenue collection patterns are heterogeneous. In general, indirect taxes are the largest component of government revenues (as a share of GDP), except for Iran, Mexico, and Venezuela, where nontax revenues from oil-producing companies is the largest, and South Africa, where the share of direct taxes is the largest. Iran, Venezuela, (C): National Survey of Consumption and Household Living Standards, 2010; Uganda (C): Uganda National Household Survey, 2012–13; United States (I): Current Population Survey, 2011; Uruguay (I): Encuesta Continua de Hogares, 2009; Venezuela (I) Encuesta Nacional de Hogares por Muestreo (ENHM), third quarter 2012.
\textsuperscript{17} Lustig and Higgins (2018).
\textsuperscript{18} Because most of the studies were completed before the latest revision of the World Bank’s global poverty line, the line used here is the old poverty line of US$1.25 per day in purchasing power parity of 2005.
\textsuperscript{19} Higgins and Lustig (2016).
and Mexico rely very heavily on oil-related nontax revenues; these revenues represent around 50 percent or more of total revenues.

**Figure 1: Size and Composition of Government Revenues (as a % of GDP; circa 2010)**

![Diagram](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD)

Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Based on the following Master Workbooks of Results: Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martinez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escudé and others, 2016); Ecuador (Llerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfeliu, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tsehaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); Georgia (Cancho and Bondarenko, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Ossei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2016); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Afkar, Jellema, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Kenya (Jaramillo, 2015); Korea (Malytsin and Popova, 2016); Mexico (Vernazza, 2010); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2014b); Pakistan (Siddiqui, 2011); Peru (Pizzuti et al., 2016); Romania (Laloi, 2010); Russia (Malytsin and Popova, 2016); South Africa (Inchauste and others, 2016); Sri Lanka (Arunatilake and others, 2016); Tanzania (Younger, Myamba, and Mdadila, 2016b); Tunisia (Jouini and others, 2015); Uganda (Jellema and others, 2016); Uruguay (Bucheli and others, 2014b) and Venezuela (Molina, 2016).

Notes: The year for which the analysis was conducted is in parenthesis. Data shown here is administrative data as reported by the studies cited; the numbers do not necessarily coincide with those found in data bases from multilateral organizations (e.g., World Bank’s WDI). Bolivia does not have personal income taxes. For Tanzania, fiscal year runs from July 2011 to June 2012. Gross National Income per capita is in 2011 PPP from World Development Indicators, August 29, 2016, [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD). The dotted line in red is the average for the 29 countries.

Figure 2 shows the level and composition of primary and social spending plus contributory pensions (panel A), and the composition of social spending for the following categories: direct transfers, education, health, other social spending, and contributory pensions around 2010 (panel B). On average, and excluding contributory pensions, the twenty-nine low-income and middle-income countries analyzed here allocate 10.3 percent of GDP to social spending, while the advanced countries in the OECD group allocate 18.8 percent of GDP—that is, almost twice as much. The twenty-nine countries on average spend 1.8 percent of GDP on direct transfers, 4.4 percent on education, and 3.1 percent on health. In comparison, the OECD countries spend on average 4.4 percent of GDP on direct transfers, 5.3 percent on education, and 6.2 percent on health. The largest difference between the OECD group and our sample occurs in direct transfers. Regarding spending on contributory pensions (which includes

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20 The difference between the sum of these three items and the total in previous sentence is “Other social spending.”
contributory pensions only and not social or noncontributory pensions, which are part of direct transfers), the twenty-nine low-income and middle-income countries spend 3.2 percent of their GDP, while OECD countries, spend 7.9 percent.

**Figure 2 (Panel A and B): Size and Composition of Primary and Social Spending plus Contributory Pensions (as a % of GDP; circa 2010)**

Panel A: Primary and Social Spending plus Contributory Pensions as a % of GDP

Panel B: Composition of Social Spending plus Contributory Pensions as a % of GDP
Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Based on the following Master Workbooks of Results. Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martinez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Saua and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escuder and others, 2016); Ecuador (Llerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfeliu, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tsehaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); Georgia (Cancho and Bondarenko, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Osei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2010); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Afkar, Jellema, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Tagdil, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Mexico (Scott, 2013); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2015b); Peru (Jaramillo, 2015); Russia (Malysin and Popova, 2016); South Africa (Inchauste and others, 2016); Sri Lanka (Arunatilake and others, 2016); Tanzania (Younger, Myamba, and Mladila, 2016b); Tunisia (Jouini and others, 2015); Uganda (Jellema and others, 2016); Uruguay (Bucheli and others, 2014b) and Venezuela (Molina, 2016).

Notes: The year for which the analysis was conducted is in parenthesis. Data shown here is administrative data as reported by the studies cited; the numbers do not necessarily coincide with those found in data bases from multilateral organizations (e.g., World Bank’s World Development Indicators [WDI]). The scenario for South Africa assumed free basic services are direct transfers. For Tanzania, fiscal year runs from July 2011 to June 2012. Figure for OECD average (includes only advanced countries) was directly provided by the statistical office of the organization. Other social spending includes expenditures on housing and community amenities; environmental protection; and recreation, culture, and religion. The only contributory pensions in South Africa are for public servants who must belong to the Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF). The government made no transfers to the GEPF in 2010/11. The only contributory pensions in Sri Lanka are for public servants, and income from pensions has been considered as part of the public employees’ labor contract, rather than a transfer in spite of the fact that the funding comes from general revenues. Gross National Income per capita on right axis is in 2011 PPP from World Development Indicators, August 29, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD.

Given the size of social spending (excluding contributory pensions), Argentina, South Africa, and Brazil (from highest to lowest) show the largest amount of resources at their disposal to engage in fiscal redistribution. At the other end of the spectrum are Uganda, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Guatemala (from lowest to highest). Whether the first group achieves its higher redistributive potential, however, depends on how the burden of taxation and the benefits of social spending are distributed. This shall be discussed below.

3. Fiscal Policy and Inequality

Recall that in order to measure the redistributive effect, each CEQ Assessment constructs four income concepts: Market Income or Market Income plus Pensions (depending on the treatment of contributory pensions), Disposable Income, Consumable Income, and Final Income. To refresh the reader’s memory, we replicate the figure presented in chapter 1 in this Handbook (see figure 3).

A typical indicator of the redistributive effect of fiscal policy is the difference between the Market Income Gini and the Gini for income after taxes and transfers, where “after” can refer to just direct taxes and transfers as in Disposable Income, to the latter plus the effect of net indirect taxes as in Consumable Income, and to the latter plus the effect of education and health spending as in Final Income. If the redistributive effect is positive (negative), fiscal policy is equalizing (unequalizing). Figure 4 presents the

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21 All the theoretical derivations that link changes in inequality to the progressivity of fiscal interventions have been derived based on the so-called family of S-Gini indicators, of which the Gini coefficient is one case. See, for example, Duclos and Araar (2006). While one can calculate the impact of fiscal policy on inequality using other indicators (and one should), it will not be possible to link them to the progressivity of the interventions.
Figure 3: Basic Income Concepts

Gini coefficient for Market Income and the other three income concepts shown in figure 10-3: Disposable, Consumable and Final Income. In broad terms, Disposable Income measures how much income individuals may spend on goods and services (and save, including mandatory savings such as contributions to a public pensions system that is actuarially fair). Consumable Income measures how much individuals are able to actually consume. For example, a given level of Disposable Income—even if consumed in full—could mean different levels of actual consumption depending on the size of indirect taxes and subsidies. Final Income includes the value of public services in education and health if individuals would have had to pay for those services at the average cost to the government. Based on the fact that contributory pensions can be treated as deferred income or as a direct transfer, here all the calculations are presented for two scenarios: one with contributory pensions included in Market Income and another with them as government transfers. For consistency, remember that in the first scenario contributions to the system are treated as mandatory savings and in the second as a tax.

Figure 4 (Panel A and B): Fiscal Policy and Inequality (circa 2010): Gini Coefficient for Market, Disposable, Consumable, and Final Income.

Panel A: Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income

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22 Other measures of inequality such as the Theil index or the 90/10 ratio are available in the individual studies. Requests should be addressed directly to the authors.
Panel B: Contributory Pensions as Transfers

Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Based on the following Master Workbooks of Results: Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martinez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escuder and others, 2016); Ecuador (Lerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfeliz, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tschaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); Georgia (Cancho and Bondarenko, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Osei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2016); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Afkar, Jellema, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Mexico (Scott, 2013); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2015b); Peru (Jaramillo, 2015); Russia (Younger, Myamba, and Mdadila, 2016b); Tanzania (Jouini and others, 2015); Uruguay (Bucheli and others, 2014b) and Venezuela (Molina, 2016).

Notes: In Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda, consumption expenditure is the primary income measure, and all other income concepts including Market Income are derived assuming that consumption expenditure is equal to Disposable Income. For Argentina, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Russia, South Africa and Tanzania, the study includes indirect effects of indirect taxes and subsidies. Bolivia does not have personal income taxes. In Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, South Africa, and Sri Lanka, Market Income does not include consumption of own production because the data was either not available or not reliable. For Brazil, the results for the analysis presented here differ from the results published in Higgins and Pereira (2014) because the latter include taxes on services (ISS), on goods and services to finance pensions (CONFINS), and to finance social workers (PIS), while the results presented here do not include them. Post publishing the mentioned paper, the authors concluded that the source for these taxes was not reliable. Gini coefficients for Chile are estimated here using total income and thus differ from official figures of inequality, which are estimated using monetary income (i.e., official figures exclude owner’s occupied imputed rent). In South Africa, the results presented here assume that free basic services are a direct transfer. In Armenia, Costa Rica, Iran, Peru, South Africa, Uruguay, and Venezuela, there are no indirect subsidies. Poverty headcount ratios and inequality rates for Uganda were estimated using adult equivalent income. For the rest of the countries, the indicators were estimated using per capita income. For the Dominican Republic, the study analyzes the effects of fiscal policy in 2013, but the household income and expenditure survey dates back to 2006–07. For Indonesia, the fiscal incidence analysis was carried out adjusting for spatial price differences. Personal income taxes are assumed to be zero because the vast majority of households have implied Market Incomes below the tax threshold. The only contributory pensions in South Africa are for public servants who must belong to the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF). Since the government made no transfers to the GEPF in 2010/11, there is no scenario with contributory pensions as transfer. The only contributory pensions in Sri Lanka are for public servants, and income from pensions has been considered as part of the public employees’ labor contract, rather than a transfer in
spite of the fact that the funding comes from general revenues. For Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Uganda, there is no scenario in which contributory pensions are considered as a transfer. Georgia has a noncontributory public pension scheme only, and therefore they are treated only as a transfer. In all these cases, the scenario is the same in both panels. The scenario for pensions as deferred income for Iran defines Market Income as proposed in this Handbook while all the other studies define Market Income as proposed in the CEQ Handbook 2013. The results for Iran’s pensions as deferred income scenario used the new definition of prefiscal income: factor income plus old-age contributory pensions MINUS contributions to old-age pensions. In the rest of the countries, the latter had not been subtracted. For Ethiopia, while the distributional results presented here incorporate the indirect effects of indirect taxes and subsidies, the results in the World Bank Poverty Assessment and chapter by Hill et al. (2017) include the direct effects only. For South Africa, the Gini coefficient for Final Income differs from the chapter by Inchauste et al. (2017).

As can be observed, in Ethiopia, Jordan, Guatemala, and Indonesia, fiscal income redistribution is quite limited, while in Argentina, Georgia, South Africa, and Brazil, it is of a relevant magnitude. One can observe that Argentina and South Africa are the countries that redistribute the most; South Africa, however, remains the most unequal even after redistribution. It is interesting to note that although Brazil and Colombia start out with similar Market Income inequality, Brazil reduces inequality considerably, while Colombia does not. Similarly, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Guatemala start out with similar levels of Market Income inequality, but Mexico and Costa Rica reduce inequality by more. Ethiopia is the less unequal of all twenty-nine countries, and fiscal redistribution is also the smallest in order of magnitude. In almost all cases, the largest change in inequality occurs between Consumable and Final Income. This is not surprising given the fact that governments spend more on education and health than on direct transfers and pensions. However, one should not make sweeping conclusions from this result because — as explained in chapters 1 and 6 of this Handbook— in-kind transfers are valued at average government cost, which is not really a measure of the “true” value of these services to the individuals who use them.

As indicated in chapter 1 in this Handbook, contributory pensions are in many cases a combination of deferred income and government transfer. Given that at present the CEQ methodology does not include a way to estimate which portion of a contributory pension is deferred income and which is a government transfer (or a tax, if the individual receives less than what he or she should have received given his or her contributions), the CEQ Assessments produce results for both “extreme” assumptions: contributory pensions as pure deferred income (in which contributions are a form of mandatory savings) and as pure government transfer (in which contributions are treated as any other direct tax). Panels A and B in figure 4 show that the patterns of inequality decline are similar whether one looks at the scenario in which contributory pensions are considered deferred income (and, thus, part of Market Income) or with pensions as transfers. In Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Russia, and Uruguay, the redistributive effect is considerably larger when contributory pensions are treated as a transfer. These are countries with higher coverage and an older population. In Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jordan and Venezuela, the effect is larger, but only very slightly. Interestingly, in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Tunisia, the redistributive effect is smaller when contributory pensions are considered a government transfer versus deferred income.

4. Measuring the Marginal Contribution of Taxes and Transfers

As discussed in chapter 1 in this Handbook, the CEQ methodology measures the impact of a tax or a transfer by relying on the marginal contribution, which, as formally discussed in chapter 2 in this

Handbook, is equal to the difference between the Gini (or other inequality measures) for a postfiscal income concept without the fiscal intervention of interest (for example, a particular tax) and the postfiscal income which includes it. Figure 5 shows the marginal contribution on net direct taxes (direct taxes net of direct transfers), net indirect taxes (indirect taxes net of subsidies), and spending on education and health (existing fiscal redistribution studies frequently stop at direct taxes and direct transfers). Note that an equalizing (unequalizing) effect is presented with a positive (negative) sign but with downward point bars. The first result to note is that net direct taxes are, as expected, always equalizing. The second result to note is that net indirect taxes (indirect taxes net of indirect subsidies) are equalizing in nineteen of the twenty-nine countries. The marginal contribution of government spending on education and health combined is always equalizing.

Figure 5 (Panel A, B and C): Marginal Contribution of Taxes and Transfers (circa 2010)

Panel A: Marginal Contributions of Net Direct Taxes (Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income)

25 For example, the data published by the EUROMOD project at the University of Essex presents results up to disposable income for the European Union (https://www.euromod.ac.uk/).
26 Note that for the reasons mentioned in the paragraph immediately above, one cannot compare the orders of magnitude between marginal contributions calculated based on the redistributive effect for different categories of income.
Panel B: Marginal Contributions of Net Indirect Taxes (Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income)

Panel C: Marginal Contributions of In-Kind Transfers in Education and Health (Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income)

Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Based on the following Master Workbooks of Results. Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martinez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escuder and others, 2016); Ecuador (Llerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfelix, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tsehaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); Georgia (Canche and Bondarenko, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Osei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2010); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Afkar, Jelleta, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Mexico (Scott, 2013); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2015b); Peru (Jaramillo, 2015); Russia (Malytsin and Popova, 2016); South Africa (Inchauste and others, 2016); Sri Lanka (Arunatilake and others, 2016); Tanzania (Younger, Myamba, and Mdadila, 2016b); Tunisia (Jouini and others, 2015); Uganda (Jelleta and others, 2016); Uruguay (Bucheli and others, 2014b) and Venezuela (Molina, 2016).

Notes: The marginal contribution of net direct taxes is calculated as the difference between Gini of market income plus contributory pensions and disposable income (panel A). The marginal contribution of net indirect taxes is calculated as the difference between Gini of
disposable income and consumable income (panel B). The marginal contribution of in-kind transfers is calculated as the difference between Gini of consumable income and final income (panel C). Also, see notes to figure 4.

Country specific results indicate that, as expected, direct taxes, direct transfers, and spending on education and health are equalizing. However, contrary to expectations, indirect taxes, indirect subsidies, and spending on tertiary education are more frequently equalizing than unequalizing. Results also show the presence of Lambert’s conundrum (see chapters 1 and 2 in this Handbook) in the case of Chile, where the VAT is regressive—the Kakwani coefficients is negative—and yet its marginal contribution is equalizing. 

5. Is There Evidence of a Robin Hood Paradox?

One of the most important findings in Lindert’s pathbreaking work is that both across countries and over time, resources devoted to the poor are lower in the nations in which poverty and inequality are greater. According to Lindert, History reveals a “Robin Hood paradox,” in which redistribution from rich to poor is least present when and where it seems most needed. Poverty policy within any one polity or jurisdiction is supposed to aid the poor more, . . . the greater the income inequality. Yet over time and space, the pattern is usually the opposite. While there are exceptions to this general tendency, the underlying tendency itself is unmistakable, both across the globe and across the past three centuries.

An examination of the relationship between prefiscal inequality and social spending suggests that there is no evidence of a “Robin Hood paradox”: as it is shown in figure 6, the more unequal countries devote more resources to tax-based redistribution measured by the size of social spending as a share of GDP (even if we leave out “outliers,” this result holds).

Figure 6: Initial Inequality and Social Spending, circa 2010 (social spending/GDP and Market Income plus Pensions inequality [contributory pensions as deferred income])

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27 These results are available upon request. For a description of Lambert's conundrum, see chapter 1.
Second, as shown in figure 7, redistribution from rich to poor is greater in countries where Market Income inequality is higher—a result that seems consistent with the prediction of the Meltzer and Richard median-voter hypothesis.31

**Figure 7: Initial Inequality and Fiscal Redistribution, circa 2010**

Redistributive effect and Market Income plus Pensions inequality (contributory pensions as deferred income)

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31 Meltzer and Richards (1981). An OECD (2011) study illustrates that more Market Income inequality tends to be associated with higher redistribution, for a subset of OECD countries, both within countries (over time) and across countries.
Notes: The dotted line in red is the slope obtained from a simple regression with the redistributive effect as a dependent variable. Redistributive effect is defined as the difference between Gini of Market Income plus Pensions and Disposable Income. In parentheses are t statistics. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Also, see notes to figure 4.

Could the above results be driven because more unequal countries tend to be richer and therefore have higher capacity to raise revenues and afford higher levels of spending? Preliminary results from regressing the redistributive effect (measured as change in the Gini coefficient from Market to Final Income in Gini points) on GNI per capita and the Market Income Gini show that the coefficient for the latter is positive: that is, the more unequal, the more redistribution. The coefficient for GNI per capita is significant, but small. The coefficient for Market Income inequality, however, is not statistically significant when the redistributive effect is measured from Market to Disposable Income only, or when the redistributive effect is measured in percent (instead of Gini points). In a few cases, the coefficient for the Market Income Gini is even negative but not significant.

Differences in redistribution change the ranking of countries by inequality level. Panel A of figure 8 displays the levels of income inequality before (horizontal axis) and after (vertical axis) accounting for fiscal policies. Since all data points fall below the diagonal, fiscal policies reduce inequality in all countries. South Africa continues to be the most unequal country and Ethiopia the least unequal country based on income (for Ethiopia, consumption) before or after fiscal policy. However, due to lower redistribution, Peru ends up being more unequal than Brazil once fiscal policies are considered while the opposite is true when inequality is measured with Market Income.

Figure 8 (Panel A and B): Market Income plus Contributory Pensions Gini versus Final Income Gini, circa 2010

Panel A: Final Income Inequality and Market Income plus Contributory Pensions Inequality (Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income)

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32 Results are available upon request.
Panel B: Final Income Inequality and Market Income Inequality (Contributory Pensions as Transfers)

![Graph showing the relationship between final income inequality and market income inequality for different countries.](image)

Source: Author’s estimates. CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Based on the following Master Workbooks of Results: Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martinez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escuder and others, 2016); Ecuador (Llerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfeliu, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tsehaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); Georgia (Cancho and Bondarenko, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Osei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2016); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Afkar, Jellema, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Mexico (Scott, 2013); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2015b); Peru (Jaramillo, 2015); Russia (Malytsin and Popova, 2016); South Africa (Inchauste and others, 2016); Sri Lanka (Arunatilake and others, 2016); Tanzania (Younger, Myamba, and Mdadi, 2016b); Tunisia (Jouini and others, 2015); Uruguay (Bucheli and others, 2014b); Venezuela (Molina, 2016).

Notes: The dotted line in red is the slope obtained from a simple regression with the final income Gini as a dependent variable. The dotted line in blue is a 45-degree line. In parentheses are t statistics. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The number of countries in panel B is smaller because it does not include the countries for which— for different reasons— there is no additional scenario in which contributory pensions were considered a transfer: namely, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Uganda. Also, see notes to figure 4.

6. Redistributive Effect: A Comparison with Advanced Countries

How do these twenty-nine countries compare with the fiscal redistribution that occurs in advanced countries? Although the methodology is somewhat different, one obvious comparator is the analysis produced by EUROMOD for the twenty-eight countries in the European Union. 33 Given that EUROMOD covers only direct taxes, contributions to social security, and direct transfers, the comparison can be done for the redistributive effect from Market (and Market Income plus Pensions) to Disposable Income. A comparison is also made with the United States. 34

There are three important differences between the advanced countries and the twenty-nine analyzed here. First, Market Income inequality tends to be somewhat higher for the twenty-nine countries. 35

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33 The data for the EU-28 is from EUROMOD (2017).
34 Higgins and others (2016).
35 South Africa pulls the average up, but Indonesia pulls it down.
However, the difference is most striking when pensions are treated as transfers. The average prefiscal Gini coefficient for the twenty-nine countries for the scenario in which pensions are treated as deferred income and the scenario in which they are considered transfers is 47.0 and 48.8 percent, respectively. In contrast, in the European Union, the corresponding figures are 35.6 and 46.3 percent, respectively; and in the United States, they are, 44.8 and 48.4, respectively. One important aspect to note, however, is that in the European Union, pensions include both contributory and noncontributory social pensions while in the twenty-nine countries and the United States, the category of pensions includes only contributory pensions. Thus, the prefiscal income in the European Union when pensions are treated as deferred income is likely to be more equally distributed (than in the United States, for example) because the prefiscal income includes social pensions as well as contributory ones.

Second, as expected and shown in figure 9, the redistributive effect is larger in the E.U. countries and, to a lesser extent, in the United States if pensions are considered a government transfer. Except for Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Russia, and Uruguay—countries with large contributory pension systems—in the rest of the low- and middle-income countries, whether pensions are treated as deferred income or a transfer makes a relatively small difference. This is not the case in the E.U. countries where the difference is huge. In the European Union, the redistributive effect with contributory pensions as deferred income and contributory pensions as a transfer is 7.7 and 19.0 Gini points, respectively. In the United States, the numbers are less dramatically different: 7.2 and 11.2, respectively. In the twenty-nine countries, the numbers are 2.6 and 3.7 Gini points, respectively. Clearly, the assumption made about how to treat incomes from pensions, again, can make a big difference. The results for the scenario with pensions as transfers for the European Union and the United States are influenced by what in chapter 1 in this Handbook we called the presence of “false poor”: that is, many households composed of retirees appear, by definition, with zero or near zero Market Income. However, as discussed in chapter 1 in this Handbook, strictly speaking the counterfactual income should not be zero but what these households would have been able to spend during retirement based on the history of their contributions and market returns.

While in low- and middle-income countries pensions can be equalizing at some times and unequalizing at other times, in no European country nor in the United States are contributory pensions are unequalizing. On the contrary, vis-à-vis Market Income without pensions, they exert a large equalizing force in the European Union and less so in the United States. Using data for 2011, for example, the difference between the Market Income Gini and the Market Income Gini plus contributory pensions is 10.7 percentage points in the European Union and 3.6 in the United States.

How does social spending in today’s developing countries compare with that of today’s advanced countries but when their income per capita was similar to that of the former (that is, when today’s rich countries were as poor as today’s developing countries)? Around 2010, El Salvador was among the countries that spent the least on education: 2.9 percent of GDP. According to Angus Maddison’s estimates, in 1990 international dollars, El Salvador’s GDP per capita in 2008 was similar to that of the United States in 1880, and Guatemala’s and Peru’s were similar to the United States’ around 1900. The United States, a pioneer in public education, devoted only 0.74 percent of GDP in 1880 and 1.24 percent
Figure 9 (Panel A and B): Redistributive Effect: Comparing Developing and Advanced Countries (change in Gini points; circa 2010)

Panel A: Individual Countries

Panel B: Low- and Middle-Income Countries, the United States, and Average for EU-28

Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Based on the following Master Workbooks of Results: Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martinez-Aguilera and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escuder and others, 2016); Ecuador (Llerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfelix, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tshaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); European Union (EUROMOD version no. G3.0); Georgia (Cancho and Bondarenko, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Osei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2016); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Afkar, Jellama, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Mexico (Scott, 2013); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2015b); Peru (Jaramillo, 2015); Russia (Malytsin and Popova, 2016); South Africa (Inchauste and others, 2016); Sri Lanka (Arunatilake and others, 2016); Tanzania (Younger, Myamba, and Mdadila, 2016b); Tunisia (Jouini
and others, 2015); Uganda (Jellema and others, 2016); United States (Higgins and others, 2016); Uruguay (Bucheli and others, 2014b) and Venezuela (Molina, 2016).

Notes: The year for which the analysis was conducted is in parenthesis. For definition of income concepts see chapters 1 and 6 in this Handbook. Redistributive effect is defined as the difference between Gini of Market Income plus Pensions and Disposable Income with contributory pensions treated as deferred income and the difference between Gini of market income and disposable income with contributory pensions treated as transfers. The graph is ranked from the smallest to the largest by redistributive effect with contributory pensions treated as deferred income. The number of countries in the scenario in which contributory pensions are treated as a transfer is smaller because it does not include the countries for which—for different reasons—there is no additional scenario in which contributory pensions were considered a transfer: namely, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Uganda. Also, see notes to figure 4.

in 1900, according to Lindert.36 That is, the lowest spenders on public education of the twenty-nine countries in this chapter spent more than twice the amount spent by the United States when it was approximately equally poor. Sweden was as rich as today’s El Salvador around 1910, at which time Sweden spent 1.26 percent of GDP on public education, or about half as much as El Salvador in 2010. Around 2010, Indonesia showed among the lowest spending on health: 0.9 percent of GDP; the figure for Ethiopia was 1.25 percent and for Brazil above 5 percent. When the United States (around 1900) was as rich as Indonesia in the early twenty-first century (2008), it spent about 0.17 percent of GDP in government subsidies for health care.37 When the United States was as rich as Brazil was in 2008, it spent only 0.4 percent of GDP in health subsidies.38

7. Fiscal Policy and the Poor

The above discussion has concentrated on the impact of fiscal policy on inequality. As important is the impact of fiscal policy on poverty, particularly because the results do not necessarily go in the same direction: in other words, an inequality-reducing fiscal system could be poverty-increasing. The effect of fiscal policy on poverty can be measured using the typical indicators such as the headcount ratio for Market Income and income after taxes and transfers. Another measure that one can use to assess the impact of fiscal policy on the poor is the extent to which Market Income poor end up being net payers to the fiscal system in cash terms (leaving out in-kind services). A third measure is that of fiscal impoverishment,39 or the extent to which fiscal policy makes the poor (non-poor) poorer (poor).

When analyzing the impact of fiscal interventions on poverty, it is useful to distinguish between the net benefits in cash from the benefits received in the form of free government services in education and health. The cash component of fiscal policy impact is measured by comparing the indicators for Consumable Income with the same indicators using Market Income. The level of Consumable Income will tell whether the government has enabled an individual to be able to purchase private goods and services above his or her original Market Income. As shown in figure10 (panel A), using the $1.25 (PPP

36 Appendix C in Lindert (2004).
37 Table 1D in Lindert (1994).
38 The United States in about 1925 was as rich as Brazil in 2008. The health spending figure corresponds to 1920 (Lindert 1994).
2005 per day) poverty line, 40 fiscal policy reduces the headcount ratio for Consumable Income in most countries. However, there is a startling result. In the scenario in which pensions are considered deferred income, the Consumable Income headcount ratio for Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Tanzania is higher than the headcount ratio for Market Income. This is a worrisome result. Poverty should not be higher as a result of fiscal policy. Note that this result occurs despite the fact that the net fiscal system (even without including in-kind transfers) reduces inequality. This emphasizes the fact that the impact of fiscal interventions on inequality and poverty should be studied separately, as indicated in chapter 1 in this Handbook. Of course, at the higher $2.50 a day poverty line, the number of countries in which the headcount for Consumable Income is higher than that for Market Income rises. 41

Figure 10 (Panel A and B): Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduction (circa 2010): Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Disposable and Consumable Income (in %)

Panel A: Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income

40 The $1.25 is the World Bank global extreme poverty line until 2015, when it was updated with the 2011 PPP to $1.90 per day. The $2.50 a day poverty line is considered to be a reasonable international extreme poverty line for middle-income countries: for example, in the case of Latin America, this poverty line is close to the average of the local extreme poverty lines.

41 Results for the scenario in which contributory pensions are treated as a pure government transfer are available upon request.
Panel B: Contributory Pensions as Transfers

![Bar chart showing poverty reduction percentage](image)

Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Based on the following Master Workbooks of Results: Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martínez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escuder and others, 2016); Ecuador (Llerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfeliú, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tschaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); Georgia (Cancho and Bondarenko, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Osei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2016); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Alkar, Jellema, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Mexico (Scott, 2013); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2015b); Peru (Jaramillo, 2015); Russia (Malytsin and Popova, 2016); South Africa (Inchauste and others, 2016); Sri Lanka (Arunatilake and others, 2016); Tanzania (Younger, Myamba, and Mdadila, 2016b); Tunisia (Jouini and others, 2015); Uganda (Jellema and others, 2016); Uruguay (Bucheli and others, 2014b) and Venezuela (Molina, 2016).

Notes: Percentage of poverty reduction is defined as percentage change in headcount ratio from Market Income (or Market Income plus Contributory Pensions) to Consumable Income. For South Africa, the poverty results differ from the chapter by Inchauste et al. (2017). For Sri Lanka, the poverty results differ from the chapter by Arunatilake, Inchauste, and Lustig (2017). Also, see notes to figure 4.

In principle, it would be desirable for the poor—especially the extreme poor—to be net receivers of fiscal resources in cash so that poor individuals can buy/consume the minimum amounts of food and other essential goods embedded in the selected poverty line. Figure 11 shows at which Market Income category, individuals —on average—become net payers to the fiscal system (again, this calculation takes into account only the cash portion of the fiscal system and excludes in-kind transfers such as access to free public education and healthcare).\(^{42}\) In Ghana, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Uganda, net payers to the fiscal system begin in the “ultra-poor” income category with US$0–US$1.25/day in purchasing power parity. In Armenia, Ethiopia and Guatemala, net payers begin in the “extreme poor” income group with

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\(^{42}\) Note that this graph presents a nonanonymous result: it looks at the extent to which the Market Income poor become net payers to the fiscal system on average. This information cannot be extrapolated from the typical poverty measures where winners and losers are not tracked.
US$1.25–US$2.50/day. In Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, and Sri Lanka, net payers to the fiscal system begin in the income category US$2.50–US$4/day in purchasing power parity—that is, in the group classified as moderately poor. In twelve countries, the net payers start in the group known as “vulnerable.” In Iran and Indonesia, only the “rich” are net payers to the fiscal system (on average). If contributory pensions are considered a government transfer (not shown), net payers to the fiscal system start in the extreme poor income group in Guatemala and Nicaragua and in the moderately poor group in Armenia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Peru.

Figure 11: Net Payers to the Fiscal System by Income Groups (contributory pensions as deferred income)

Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Based on the following Master Workbooks of Results: Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martinez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escuder and others, 2016); Ecuador (Llerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfeliu, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tschaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); Georgia (Cancho and Bondarenko, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Osei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2016); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Akar, Jellema, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Mexico (Scott, 2013); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2015b); Peru (Jaramillo, 2015); Russia (Malysin and Popova, 2016); South Africa (Inchauste and others, 2016); Sri Lanka

43 These income categories are based on Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) and Ferreira and others (2012).
Using the measures discussed in Higgins and Lustig (2016), we find that the proportion of poor (non-poor) people who were made poorer (poor) of the by fiscal policy as a share of the total population and, in particular, the Consumable Income poor is not trivial, as table 1 demonstrates. Moreover, this is so even though in the majority of countries shown on the table, the fiscal system is inequality- and poverty-reducing as revealed by the change in the headcount ratio and the Gini coefficient.

Table 1: Fiscal Impoverishment (circa 2010): Contributory Pensions as Deferred Income (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (survey year)</th>
<th>Market income plus contributory pensions poverty headcount (%)</th>
<th>Change in poverty headcount (p.p.)</th>
<th>Market income plus contributory pensions inequality Reynolds-Smolensky</th>
<th>Change in inequality (G)</th>
<th>Fiscally impoverished as % of population</th>
<th>Fiscally impoverished as % of consumable income poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: Upper-middle income countries, using a poverty line of $2.5 2005 PPP per day</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (2009)</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (2013)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador (2011)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (2012)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (2011)</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (2010)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (2010)</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (2010)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B: Lower-middle income countries, using a poverty line of $1.25</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia (2011)</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia (2009)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic (2013)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador (2011)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ethiopia (2011)</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana (2013)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (2010)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (2012)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (2010)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (2011)</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8. Education and Health Spending

To what extent are the poor benefiting from government spending on education and health? The poverty of public spending on education and health here is measured using concentration coefficients

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44 Higgins and Lustig (2016); also included as chapter 4 in this handbook.
45 Section based on Lustig (2015).
In keeping with conventions, spending is defined as regressive whenever the concentration coefficient is higher than the Gini for Market Income. When this occurs, it means that the benefits from that spending as a share of Market Income tend to rise with Market Income. Spending is progressive whenever the concentration coefficient is lower than the Gini for Market Income. This means that the benefits from that spending as a share of Market Income tend to fall with Market Income. Within progressive spending, spending is neutral in absolute terms—spending per capita is the same across the income distribution—whenever the concentration coefficient is equal to zero. Spending is defined as pro-poor whenever the concentration coefficient not only is lower than the Gini but also its value is negative. Pro-poor spending implies that the per capita government spending on the transfer tends to fall with Market Income. Any time spending is pro-poor or neutral in absolute terms, it is by definition progressive. The converse, of course, is not true.

The taxonomy of transfers is synthesized in figure 1-4 in chapter 1 of this Handbook.

A clarification is in order. In the analysis presented here, households are ranked by per capita Market Income, and no adjustments are made to their size because of differences in the composition by age and gender. In some analyses, the pro-poorness of education spending, for example, is determined using children—not all members of the household—as the unit of analysis. Because poorer families have, on average, a larger number of children, the observation that concentration curves are pro-poor is a reflection of this fact. It does not mean that poorer families receive more resources per child.

Table 2 summarizes the results regarding the pro-poorness of government spending on education (total and by level) and health. Total spending on education is pro-poor (that is, per capita spending declines with income) in upper-middle-income and high-income countries except for South Africa and Iran, where it is (approximately) neutral in absolute terms. Total per capita spending on education tends to be the same (neutral in absolute terms) across different income groups in low-income and lower-middle-income countries, except for Armenia and El Salvador, where it is pro-poor, and Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda, where it is progressive only in relative terms. Preschool tends to be pro-poor in all countries for which there is data except for Georgia. Primary school is pro-poor in all countries other than Ethiopia. For secondary school, spending is pro-poor in all upper-middle-income countries for which there is data. In Mexico, lower secondary is pro-poor and upper secondary is progressive only in relative term. Secondary-school spending is neutral in most low-income and lower-middle-income countries other than Bolivia (pro-poor), as well as Ethiopia, Ghana and Uganda (progressive only in relative term). Government spending on tertiary education is regressive in Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Uganda, and Tanzania, and progressive only in relative terms in various degrees in the rest.

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46 A concentration coefficient is calculated in a way analogous to the Gini coefficient. Let \( p \) be the cumulative proportion of the total population when individuals are ordered in increasing income values using Market Income, and let \( C(p) \) be the concentration curve; the cumulative proportion of total program benefits (of a particular program or aggregate category) received by the poorest \( p \) percent of the population. Then, the concentration coefficient of that program or category is defined as \( 2 \int_0^1 (p - C(p)) \, dp \).

47 I say “tend” because for global regressivity/progressivity to occur, it is not a necessary condition for the share of the benefit to rise/fall at each and every income level. When the latter occurs, the benefit is regressive/progressive everywhere. Whenever a benefit is everywhere regressive/progressive, it will be globally regressive/progressive, but the converse is not true.

48 This case is also sometimes called “progressive in absolute terms.”

49 As mentioned above, care must be taken not to infer that any spending that is progressive (regressive) will automatically be equalizing (unequalizing).
Results: Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martinez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escudero and others, 2016); Ecuador (Llerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfeliu, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tsehaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); Georgia (Cancho and Bonete, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Ossei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2010); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Akar, Jellema, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Mexico (Scott, 2013); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2015b); Peru (Jaramillo, 2015); Russia (Malytsin and Popova, 2016); South Africa (Inchauste and others, 2016); Sri Lanka (Anuradhapura and others, 2016); Tanzania (Younger, Myamba, and Mdadila, 2016b); Tunisia (Jouini and others, 2015); Uganda (Jellema and others, 2016); Uruguay (Bucheli and others, 2014b) and Venezuela (Molina, 2016).

Notes:

A = Pro-poor, concentration coefficient is negative. B = Same per capita for all, concentration coefficient equals zero. C = Progressive, concentration coefficient positive but lower than market income plus contributory pensions Gini. D = Regressive, concentration coefficient positive and higher than market income plus contributory pensions Gini. If the concentration coefficient is higher or equal to −0.5 but not higher than 0.5, it was considered equal to 0. Also, see notes to figure 4.
-- Not available

Health spending is pro-poor (that is, per capita spending declines with income) in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Georgia, South Africa, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In Armenia, Bolivia, Ghana, Honduras, Iran, Mexico, Nicaragua, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Uganda, the per capita benefit is roughly the same across the income scale. In El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Peru, and Tanzania, health spending per person is progressive only in relative terms.

While the results regarding the pro-poorness of spending on education and health are quite encouraging, a caveat is in order. Guaranteeing access to and facilitating usage of public education and health services for the poor is not enough. As long as the quality of schooling and healthcare provided by the

Table 2: Progressivity and Pro-Poorness of Education and Health Spending, Summary of Results

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-school</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Total Education</td>
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<td>B =</td>
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<td>Argentina (2012)</td>
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<td>Armenia (2011)</td>
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<td>Bolivia (2008)</td>
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<td>Brazil (2014)</td>
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<td>Chile (2010)</td>
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<td>Venezuela (2016)</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Based on the following Master Workbooks of Results: Argentina (Rossignolo, 2017); Armenia (Younger and Khachatryan, 2014); Bolivia (Paz Arauco and others, 2014b); Brazil (Higgins and Pereira, 2017); Chile (Martinez-Aguilar and Ortiz-Juarez, 2016); Colombia (Melendez and Martinez, 2015); Costa Rica (Sauma and Trejos, 2014b); Dominican Republic (Aristy-Escudero and others, 2016); Ecuador (Llerena and others, 2017); El Salvador (Beneke de Sanfeliu, Lustig, and Oliva Cepeda, 2014); Ethiopia (Hill, Tsehaye, and Woldehanna, 2014); Georgia (Cancho and Bondarenko, 2015); Ghana (Younger, Ossei-Assibey, and Oppong, 2010); Guatemala (Cabrera and Moran, 2015a); Honduras (Castaneda and Espino, 2015); Indonesia (Akar, Jellema, and Wai-Poi, 2015); Iran (Enami, Lustig, and Taqdiri, 2017b); Jordan (Abdel-Halim and others, 2016); Mexico (Scott, 2013); Nicaragua (Cabrera and Moran, 2015b); Peru (Jaramillo, 2015); Russia (Malytsin and Popova, 2016); South Africa (Inchauste and others, 2016); Sri Lanka (Anuradhapura and others, 2016); Tanzania (Younger, Myamba, and Mdadila, 2016b); Tunisia (Jouini and others, 2015); Uganda (Jellema and others, 2016); Uruguay (Bucheli and others, 2014b) and Venezuela (Molina, 2016).
government is low, distortive patterns such as those observed in Brazil and South Africa (for example, mostly the middle classes and the rich benefiting from free tertiary education\textsuperscript{50}) will be a major obstacle to the equalization of opportunities. However, with the existing information, one cannot disentangle to what extent the progressivity or pro-poorness of education and health spending is a result of differences in family composition (the poor have more children and, therefore, poor households receive higher benefits in the form of basic education transfers) or frequency of illness (the poor have worse health than the non-poor) versus the “opting-out” of the middle classes and the rich.

9. Conclusions

In order to analyze the impact of fiscal policy on income inequality, it is useful to separate the “cash portion” of the system. The cash portion includes direct taxes, direct transfers, indirect taxes, and indirect subsidies. The noncash, or “in-kind,” portion includes the monetized value of the use of government education and health services. The results show that the reduction in inequality induced by the cash portion of the fiscal system in the twenty-nine countries analyzed here is quite heterogeneous. Redistributive success is broadly determined primarily by the amount of resources and their combined progressivity. Net direct taxes are always equalizing. The effect of net indirect taxes is equalizing in nineteen of the twenty-nine countries.

While the cash portion of the net fiscal system is always equalizing, the same cannot be said for poverty. In Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Tanzania, for instance, the headcount ratio measured with the international extreme poverty line of US$1.25 (PPP 2005 per day) is higher for Consumable Income than for Market Income. In these countries, fiscal policy increases poverty, meaning that a larger number of the Market Income poor (non-poor) are made poorer (poor) by taxes and transfers than the number of people who escape poverty.\textsuperscript{51} This startling result is primarily the consequence of high consumption taxes on basic goods.

Turning now to the in-kind portion of the fiscal system, spending on education and health is equalizing, and its contribution to the reduction in inequality is rather large. This result is not surprising given that the use of government services is monetized at a value equal to average government cost. While the results concerning the distribution of the benefits of in-kind services in education and health are encouraging from the equity point of view, it is important to note that they may be due to factors one would prefer to avoid. The more intensive use of services in education and health on the part of the poorer portions of the population, for example, may be caused by the fact that in their quest for quality, the middle classes (and, of course, the rich) chose to use private providers. This situation leaves the poor with access to second-rate services. In addition, if the middle classes opt out of public services, they may be much more reluctant to pay the taxes needed to improve both the coverage and the quality of services than they would be if services were used universally.

An important result to note is that there is no evidence of a “Robin Hood paradox:” the more unequal countries tend to spend more on redistribution and show a higher redistributive effect. However,

\textsuperscript{50} Among the reasons for this outcome is the fact that children of poor households tend to drop out of high school more, and the rich children who receive enough quality (often private) education are better equipped to pass the entrance examination.

\textsuperscript{51} Higgins and Lustig (2016).
regression-based analysis indicates that this last result is not robust across the board when one controls for income per capita, leaves out the “outliers,” or measures redistribution in percent change instead of Gini points. While the sign of the slope shows that the more unequal a country is before taxes and transfers, the more redistribution occurs, the coefficient is often not statistically significant.

There are a few lessons that emerge from the analysis. Let’s start with those pertaining to the diagnostic of fiscal redistribution. First, the fact that specific fiscal interventions can have countervailing effects underscores the importance of taking a coordinated view of both taxation and spending rather than pursuing a piecemeal analysis. Efficient regressive taxes (such as the value-added tax) when combined with generous well-targeted transfers can result in a net fiscal system that is equalizing. Even more, because a net fiscal system with a regressive tax could be more equalizing than without it (Lambert’s conundrum), policy recommendations—such as eliminating the regressive tax—based on a piecemeal analysis could be flatly wrong. Second, to assess the impact of the fiscal system on people’s standard of living, it is crucial to measure the effect of taxation and spending not only on inequality but also on poverty: the net fiscal system can be equalizing but poverty-increasing.

Regarding policy prescriptions, one fundamental lesson emerges: governments should design their tax and transfers system so that the after taxes and transfers incomes (or consumption) of the poor are not lower than their incomes (or consumption) before fiscal interventions. Leaving out in-kind transfers, the so-called cash portion of the fiscal system should not impoverish the poor (or make the non-poor poor). The results indicate that, on average, the ultra-poor in Ghana, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Uganda, the extreme poor in Armenia, Ethiopia, and Guatemala, and the moderate poor in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru and Sri Lanka are net payers into the fiscal system. In the case of Brazil, the cause is the high consumption taxes paid on staple goods. In the case of Peru, cash transfers are too small to compensate for what the poor pay in taxes. Furthermore, as shown in Higgins and Lustig (2016) (reproduced as chapter 4), fiscal impoverishment can be quite pervasive and, in low-income countries, larger in magnitude than fiscal gains to the poor.

The current policy discussion (and the literature) focuses primarily on the power of fiscal policy to reduce inequality and much less (and often not at all) on the impact of fiscal policy on the standard of living of the poor. If the policy community is seriously committed to eradicating income poverty, governments will need to explore ways to redesign taxation and transfers so that the poor do not end up as net payers. This could become an overriding principle in the design of fiscal systems that could be explicitly added to the frameworks proposed by Atkinson (2015) and Stiglitz (2012) to build more equitable societies.
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